THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

NAGPRA AND ITS LIMITATIONS: REPATRIATION OF INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL HERITAGE
KEVIN P. RAY
ABSTRACT
The historical conditions under which indigenous (and specifically Native American)
cultural heritage objects have been collected present tremendous difficulties, since
collecting efforts were frequently influenced, or even directed, by racist or colonialist
ideologies. Recent decades have seen efforts to redress past wrongs, as well as to
correct misunderstandings and misrepresentations. The restitution and repatriation
processes of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990,
enacted as human rights legislation, provide powerful, but imperfect tools for the
protection of Native American cultural heritage. The challenges are both domestic
and international. Recent French auction sales of Hopi, Zuni, and Navajo sacred
objects highlight the limitations of the available legal tools. But NAGPRA’s
limitations do not only manifest in its lack of extraterritorial effect. Even
domestically, courts have often interpreted NAGPRA restrictively, with little
understanding of Native American cultures.
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NAGPRA AND ITS LIMITATIONS: REPATRIATION OF INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL HERITAGE
KEVIN P. RAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The restitution and repatriation processes of the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 1 (“NAGPRA”) provide powerful, but
imperfect tools for the protection of Native American cultural heritage. The
challenges are both domestic and international. Recent French auction sales of Hopi,
Zuni, and Navajo sacred objects highlight the limitations of the available legal tools.
But NAGPRA’s limitations do not only manifest in its lack of extraterritorial effect.
In several notable instances, courts have shown a tendency to interpret NAGPRA
restrictively, often with little understanding of Native American cultures.
II. THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF COLLECTING NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL ITEMS
NAGPRA was enacted fundamentally as human rights legislation, intended to
address and provide some redress for centuries of exploitation, displacement, and
dispossession. Individual and institutional collecting of Native American cultural
items, including, as NAGPRA recognizes, human remains, associated funerary
objects, unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony, has a
long, troubled history. Collecting efforts were frequently driven by racist and
colonialist ideological or political projects.
The House Report submitted in connection with NAGPRA summarized this
history as follows:
Digging and removing the contents of Native American graves for
reasons of profit or curiosity has been common practice. These
activities were at their peak during the last century and the early
part of this century.
* © Kevin P. Ray 2016. Kevin Ray is Of Counsel in the Chicago office of Greenberg Traurig
LLP. He focuses his practice in the areas of art and cultural heritage law and financial services
(lending transactions and restructuring/insolvency matters). He represents and advises artists, art
galleries, art collectors, museums and cultural institutions in a variety of transactions, including
consignments, questions of title, provenance, and compliance with national and international law.
He advises lenders and debtors on issues unique to art, antiquities and other cultural property in a
variety of lending and commercial transactions. Prior to practicing law, Kevin was director of rare
books, manuscripts and art collections at Washington University in St. Louis and taught at the
Washington University School of Art. Kevin is the author of Art and Cultural Property
(forthcoming, American Bar Association Press, 2016), is a frequent speaker and writer on art and
cultural heritage law issues, and is a frequent contributor to Greenberg Traurig's art and cultural
property law blog, Cultural Assets (http://www.gtlaw-culturalassets.com/)
1 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013
(2012).
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In 1868, the Surgeon General issued an order to all Army field
officers to send him Indian skeletons. This was done so that studies
could be performed to determine whether the Indian was inferior to
the white man due to the size of the Indian’s cranium. This action,
along with an attitude that accepted the desecration of countless
Native American burial sites, resulted in hundreds of thousands [of]
Native American human remains and funerary objects being sold or
housed in museums and educational institutions around the
[country].
For many years, Indian tribes have attempted to have the remains
and funerary objects of their ancestors returned to them. This effort
has touched off an often heated debate on the rights of the Indian
versus the importance to museums of the retention of their collections
and the scientific value of the items.2
Thomas Jefferson was perhaps the first to document the excavation of a Native
American burial mound. In 1788, Jefferson opened a burial mound near Monticello,
and of it wrote, “I conjectured that in this barrow might have been a thousand
skeletons.”3 The ideological framework for these excavations and studies denied any
affiliation between the earliest inhabitants of the Americas and modern Native
Americans, who were believed to be degraded and were considered inferior
latecomers. As Patty Gerstenblith has written:
[t]he burial mounds and antiquities found on the American continent
were not thought to be associated with the living Native Americans
but rather the product of either a past civilization of the Old World or
an extinct group of Indians who were clearly superior to the modern
Indians.4
In the late 18th and early to mid-19th centuries, collecting of Native American
culture focused primarily on human remains and burial objects. But “[i]n the
post-Civil War years, the study of [the] Indian shifted in focus. In archaeology,
rather than a search for Indian racial origins, the emphasis now was on early human
inhabitation in the Americas and on museum collecting.”5 Many of the most
prominent collecting institutions—including the Smithsonian Institution (1846), the
Peabody Museum (Harvard) (1856), the American Museum of Natural History
(1869), and the Field Museum (1893)—were founded in this period, and with them
the disciplines of anthology and archaeology. In 1876, the Smithsonian’s Bureau of
American Ethnology sponsored the first large-scale collecting expedition to the
pueblos of New Mexico and Arizona. It has been “commonplace for public agencies to
H.R. REP. NO. 101-877 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367-68.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 92-96 (Harper & Row, 1964).
4 PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW, 871 (Carolina Academic
Press, 3d ed. 2012).
5 ROBERT E. BEIDER, A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN
INDIAN REMAINS, 23 (1990). Typed Manuscript, April 1990, available from Native American Rights
Fund, http://www.narf.org/nill/documents/narf_bieder_remains.pdf.
2
3
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treat Native American dead as archaeological resources, property, pathological
material, data, specimens, or library books, but not as human beings.” 6
As Janet Berlo has observed, “[o]ur constructs of what comprises Indian art was
largely molded by these institutions and their collecting policies.” 7 The leading
figures of the period, sought out the “oldest” objects, which they interpreted as being
the “most authentic.” Consistent with the prevailing western expansionist belief in
America’s “manifest destiny,” they regarded Native American cultures as vanishing,
and sought to document and preserve them for science. The concept of the vanishing
Indian shaped the collectors’ focus.
“Most of the principal North American collections of Indian artifacts,” according
to Jonathan King:
were created between 1860 and 1930, in large museums in eastern
and central North America. It is inevitable, therefore, that most of
the standards by which traditionalism in Indian art is judged depend
upon these collections for purposes of definition and comparison. The
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, saw
enormous upheavals in Indian North America . . . And ironically, this
was the peak period of collecting. As a result, the most traumatic
period in Native American history has provided the material basis for
the definition of what is traditional and what is not. Basketry, bead
costume, and carving from this time exist in such large quantities
that they are used as a general, though unstated, yardstick by which
the unconscious standards of traditionalism are set. 8
The collecting of Native American cultural items was later reframed, from a
chiefly ethnological concern to an artistic/aesthetic one. In 1941, the Museum of
Modern Art mounted an influential exhibition, “Indian Art of the United States,”
which drew parallels between Native American art and Modern art.
III. NAGPRA
In 1979, Congress was presented with the report of a study mandated by the
American Religious Freedom Act, which identified the frequently illegitimate means
by which many Native American objects had been obtained. The report stated that:
Museum records show that some sacred objects were sold by their
original Native owner or owners. In many instances, however, the
chain of title does not lead to the original owners. Some religious
property left the original ownership during military confrontations,
was included in the spoils of war and eventually fell to the control of
6 Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 43 (1992).
7 JANET C. BERLO, THE EARLY YEARS OF NATIVE AMERICAN ART HISTORY, 2 (University of
British Columbia Press, 1992).
8 Id.
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museums. Also in times past, sacred objects were lost by Native
owners as a result of less violent pressures exerted by
federally-sponsored missionaries and Indian agents.
Most sacred objects were stolen from their original owners. In other
cases, religious property was converted and sold by Native people who
did not have ownership or title to the sacred object.
Today, in many parts of the country, it is common for ‘pothunters’ to
enter Indian and public lands for the purpose of illegally
expropriating sacred objects. Interstate trafficking in and exporting
of such property flourishes, with some of these sacred objects
eventually entering into the possession of museums. 9
Soon thereafter, “a number of Northern Cheyenne leaders discovered that
almost 18,500 human remains were warehoused in the Smithsonian Institution.
This discovery served as a catalyst for a concerted national effort by Indian tribes
and organizations to obtain legislation to repatriate human remains and cultural
artifacts to Indian tribes and descendants of the deceased. Between 1986 and 1990, a
number of bills were introduced in the 99th, 100th, and 101st Congresses to address
this issue.”10 NAGPRA was enacted in November 1990.
IV. KENNEWICK MAN AND “NATIVE AMERICAN”
In 1996, several teens found a human skull and bones along the shore of the
Columbia River outside Kennewick, Washington. Since the remains, subsequently
referred to as “Kennewick Man,” were discovered on federal land, they were sent to
an anthropologist for analysis, consistent with the provisions of the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act of 1979 (“ARPA”). ARPA provides for issuance of permits
before archaeological resources are excavated and removed from federal lands, and
preserved after excavation or removal.11 For purposes of ARPA, human skeletal
remains are archaeological resources (and are therefore subject to ARPA’s
requirements) if they are (1) discovered on public land or Indian Lands,12 (2) more
than 100 years old,13 and (3) “capable of providing scientific or humanistic
understanding of past human behavior, cultural adaptation, and related topics

9 Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 44 (1992) (quoting
Secretary of the Interior Fed. Agencies Task Force, Am. Indian Religious Freedom Act Rep. 77, Aug.
1979). The report to Congress was required by § 2 of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012).
10 Id. at 54-55.
11 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b) (2006).
12 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)(1) (2006).
13 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (2006).
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through the application of scientific or scholarly techniques.” 14 Kennewick Man was
excavated pursuant to a permit issued under ARPA. 15
Because of physical characteristics—the shape of the skull and facial bones—
scientists initially believed the remains were the remains of an early European
settler. However, radiocarbon dating showed the remains to be ca. 9,000 years old. 16
Five tribal groups from the area around the Columbia River opposed further
scientific study of the remains and demanded, pursuant to NAGPRA, that the
remains be turned over to the tribes for reburial. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
which controls the federal lands on which the remains were found, agreed with the
tribes and seized the remains, intending to return them to the tribes for reburial.
A group of scientists, led by Robson Bonnichsen, then-Director of the Center for
the Study of the First Americans at Oregon State University, requested that the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers postpone re-interment of Kennewick Man and allow
qualified scientists to examine the remains. The scientists argued that:
Human skeletons this old are extremely rare in the Western
Hemisphere, and most found to date have consisted of very
fragmented remains. Here, by contrast, almost 90% of this man’s
bones were recovered in relatively good condition, making
“Kennewick Man” . . . one of the most complete early Holocene human
skeletons ever recovered in the Western Hemisphere.17
When the scientists did not receive a response to their request, they filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon for, among other things, a
finding that Kennewick Man was not “Native American” within the meaning of
NAGPRA, and therefore the repatriation requirements of NAGPRA did not apply. In
2002, the District Court held in favor of the scientists, determining that:
The physical features of the Kennewick Man appear to be dissimilar
to all modern American Indians, including the Tribal Claimants.
That does not preclude the possibility of a relationship between the
two. However, absent a satisfactory explanation for those differences,
it does make such a relationship less likely, and suggests that the
Kennewick Man might have been part of a group that did not survive
or whose remaining members were integrated into another
group . . . NAGPRA was intended to reunite tribes with remains or
cultural items whose affiliation was known, or could be reasonably
ascertained. At best, we can only speculate as to the possible group
affiliation of the Kennewick Man, whether his group even survived

30 C.F.R. § 251.1 (2016) (defining “archaeological interest”).
See Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1166 (D. Ore. 2002).
16 For a description of the initial analysis, see James C. Chatters, Kennewick Man,
SMITHSONIAN, https://www.mnh.si.edu/arctic/html/kennewick_man.html.
17 Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp.2d at 1120-1121.
14
15
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for very long after his death, and whether that group is related to any
of the Tribal Claimants.18
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Tribal Claimants appealed the
decision, and in April 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued its decision, affirming the District Court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit read
the plain language of NAGPRA—and particularly its definition of “Native
American”—to require that discovered human remains have a relationship to a
presenting existing tribe. The Court noted that:
NAGPRA vests “ownership or control” of newly discovered Native
American human remains in the decedent’s lineal descendants or, if
lineal descendants cannot be ascertained, in a tribe “affiliated” with
the remains, . . . NAGPRA mandates a two-part analysis. The first
inquiry is whether human remains are Native American within the
statute’s meaning. If the remains are not Native American, then
NAGPRA does not apply. However, if the remains are Native
American, the NAGPRA applies, triggering the second inquiry of
determining which persons or tribes are most closely affiliated with
the remains.19
The Court further observed:
NAGPRA defines human remains as “Native American” if the
remains are “of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is
indigenous to the United States.” . . . The text of the relevant
statutory clause is written in the present tense (“of, or relating to, a
tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous”). Thus the statute
unambiguously requires that human remains bear some relationship
to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture to be considered
Native American.20
The Ninth Circuit concluded:
because Kennewick Man’s remains are so old and the information
about his era so limited, the record does not permit the Secretary to
conclude reasonably that Kennewick Man shares special and
significant genetic or cultural features with presently existing
indigenous tribes, people, or cultures. We thus hold that Kennewick
Man’s remains are not Native American human remains within the
meaning of NAGPRA and that NAGPRA does not apply to them.

Id. at 1146-1147.
Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2004).
20 Id. citing 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (emphasis in original).
18
19
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Studies of the Kennewick Man’s remains by Plaintiffs-scientists may
proceed pursuant to ARPA.21
The Court contrasted the definition of “Native American” with the definition of
“Native Hawaiian,” which is “any individual who is a descendant of the aboriginal
people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that now
constitutes the State of Hawaii.” The Court reasoned that:
The “United States” is a political entity that dates back to
1789 . . . This term supports that Congress’s use of the present tense
(“that is indigenous”) referred to tribes, peoples, and cultures that
exist in modern times, not to those that may have existed thousands
of years ago but who do not exist now. By contrast, when Congress
chose to harken back to earlier times, it described a geographic
location (“the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii”) rather
than a political entity (“the United States”). 22
In 2007, Senators Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.)
introduced The Native American Omnibus Technical Corrections Act of 2007,23
which, among other things, would have revised NAGPRA’s definition of “Native
American.” The revised definition would have read: “‘Native American’ means of, or
relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is or was indigenous to any geographic
area that is now located within the boundaries of the United States” (additions
italicized).
The bill, however, was never enacted, and NAGPRA’s original definition of
“Native American” remains as it was. However, nearly two decades after Kennewick
Man’s discovery, facts have outstripped the evidence available to the Ninth Circuit.
In June 2015, Danish geneticist Dr. Eske Willerslev and his colleagues at the
University of Copenhagen published in the scientific journal “Nature” the results of
their genetic sequencing of Kennewick Man’s genome, concluding that the remains
are more closely related to modern Native Americans than to any other living
population.24 More particularly, genetic testing shows that Kennewick Man is most
closely related to the Colville Tribe, one of the original Tribal Claimants. The
Kennewick Man results further support Willersley’s team’s 2014 study of the sole
existing Clovis skeleton. The Clovis people were early inhabitants of the Americas,
13,000 years ago. They are known chiefly from their distinctive tools, which are
found across the continental United States. The only skeleton to be discovered to
date in association with Clovis sites is a boy discovered at the Anzick Site in
Montana in 1969, and is 12,600 years old. Willersley’s study shows that Clovis
people are also ancestors to contemporary Native Americans. 25 Willersley’s study of
Id. at 882.
Id. at 878-879.
23 S. 2087, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/110thcongress/senate-bill/2087.
24 Ewen Callaway, Ancient American Genome Rekindle Legal Row, NATURE (June 18, 2015),
http://www.nature.com/news/ancient-american-genome-rekindles-legal-row-1.17797.
25 See, e.g., America’s Only Clovis Skeleton Had Its Genome Mapped, UNIVERSITY OF
COPENHAGEN (Feb. 12, 2014), http://news.ku.dk/all_news/2014/02/americas-only-clovis-skeleton-had21
22
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the Anzick Clovis boy was undertaken in consultation with Native American tribes
from the area around the Anzick Site, and, with the confirmation of affiliation that
the study provides, the Anzick Clovis boy will be repatriated to the tribes for
re-interment.
At the present time, the future of Kennewick Man is uncertain. He remains in
the custodial care of the Burke Museum in Seattle, where he has been since 1999,
under a curatorial services agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 26
V. JIM THORPE—PRIVILEGING THE NUCLEAR FAMILY OVER TRIBAL ASSOCIATION
If, in the view of courts interpreting NAGPRA, Kennewick Man was too old for
the statute to apply, the repatriation request made by the heirs of Olympian Jim
Thorpe and by the Sac and Fox Nation proves to be too recent. Even though the
appellate court acknowledged that the request fell within the plain language of the
statute, it viewed the case as a dispute within a nuclear family only, erasing the
complex relationship between individual, immediate family, and tribal association.
Jim Thorpe was of Sauk heritage, and an enrolled member of the Sac and Fox
Nation of Oklahoma. When Thorpe died in 1953, Sac and Fox funeral and burial
rites were commenced. However, those rites were interrupted when Thorpe’s widow,
Patricia, known as “Patsy,” who was not Native American, insisted on removal of the
body. In 1954, Patsy entered into an agreement with two towns in eastern
Pennsylvania, for Thorpe’s remains to be interred there, a memorial erected, and the
combined towns renamed after Thorpe. The Sac and Fox Nation was not party to the
agreement.
In 2010, Thorpe’s surviving sons and the Sac and Fox Nation filed suit against
the Borough of Jim Thorpe for the repatriation of Thorpe’s remains to the Sac and
Fox Nation under NAGPRA. The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania held that NAGPRA applied to the claim for repatriation of Thorpe’s
remains, and that the Borough constituted a “museum” within the meaning of
NAGPRA. The court noted that NAGPRA defines “museum” as “any institution or
State or local government agency (including any institution of higher learning) that
received Federal funds and has possession of, or control over, Native American
cultural items.”27
The Court concluded that the Borough is a “museum” for purposes of NAGPRA
because (1) it has possession or control of Thorpe’s remains, (2) Thorpe was Native
American, and (3) it receives Federal funds. 28 In holding that NAGPRA applied, the
District Court noted that:

its-genome-mapped/; see also Richard Harris, Ancient DNA Ties Native Americans from Two
Continents
to
Clovis
(Feb.
13,
2014,
3:03
AM
ET),
NPR,
http://www.npr.org/2014/02/13/276021092/ancient-dna-ties-native-americans-from-two-continentsto-clovis.
26 Kennewick
Man,
The
Ancient
One,
BURKE
MUSEUM
(May
2,
2015),
http://www.burkemuseum.org/kennewickman.
27 Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, Case No. 3:CV-10-1317, 2013 WL 1703572, *8 (M.D. Pa.
April 19, 2013) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 3001(8) (2012)).
28 Id. at 15.

[15:472 2016]

NAGPRA and Its Limitations:
Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage

481

Given that Jim Thorpe’s widow made an agreement with the
municipalities to inter his body there in exchange for them naming
their jointure Jim Thorpe, the result here may seem at odds with our
common notions of commercial or contract law. Congress, however,
recognized larger and different concerns in such circumstances,
namely, the sanctity of the Native American culture’s treatment of
the remains of those of Native American ancestry. It did so against a
history of exploitation of Native American artifacts and remains for
commercial purposes. The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act recognizes the importance of compliance with Native
American culture and tradition where dealing with the remains of
one of Native American heritage, and this is a case which fits within
the reach of this congressional purpose.29
In a decision that privileges the concept of the nuclear family over tribal
association, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
District Court’s decision, while acknowledging that applying NAGPRA as written
would require affirming that decision. The Third Circuit concluded:
that Congress could not have intended the kind of patently absurd
result that would follow from a court resolving a family dispute by
applying NAGPRA to Thorp’s burial in the Borough under the
circumstances here . . . [W]e are confronted with the unusual
situation in which literal application of NAGPRA ‘will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters’ . . . As
stated in the House Report, ‘[t]he purpose of [NAGPRA] is to protect
Native American burial sites and the removal of human remains.’
H.R. Rep. (emphasis added). NAGPRA was intended as a shield
against further injustices to Native Americans. It was not intended
to be wielded as a sword to settle familial disputes within Native
American families. Yet, that is what we would allow if we were to
enforce NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions as written here.30
The Thorpe heirs and the Sac and Fox Nation appealed the Third Circuit’s
decision, filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United
States.31 On October 5, 2015, the Supreme Court denied the petition, allowing the
Third Circuit’s decision to stand. The National Congress of American Indians,
Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Colo.), Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.), and former
New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson had all supported the petition. 32

Id. at 18.
Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 257-265 (3rd Cir. 2014).
31 Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
2015 WL 3486600 (No. 14-1419).
32 Vidya Kauri, Supreme Court Rejects Row Over Jim Thorpe’s Remains, LAW360 (Oct. 5,
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/711167/supreme-court-rejects-row-over-jim-thorpe-s-remains.
29
30
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A. Whale House Artifacts
Since NAGPRA does not reach Native American cultural items held by private
individuals or entities, repatriation of such cultural items requires multiple methods
of approach, both legal and non-legal. Typically, successful repatriation of Native
American cultural items from private parties requires a combination of the canny use
of publicity with legal and moral arguments. Where applicable, it is important to
establish common tribal ownership or the non-alienability of cultural items. If a
cultural item cannot be alienated, or requires the authorization of the tribe or tribal
authorities before being alienated, then removal or sale of such items is wrongful and
return justified. However, given the complex history of collecting and removal of
Native American cultural items, establishing individual or tribal ownership is often
difficult.
The removal and ultimate return of the Klukwan Whale House artifacts
exemplifies this challenge. The artifacts, consisting of four intricately-carved and
ornamented house posts and a rain screen, were created around 1820 in the Alaskan
Chilkat Indian Village of Klukwan. The Thlingit leader Xetsuwu resolved to build a
new house (Whale House) to unify existing house groups of the Ganexteidi Clan. He
commissioned the house posts, which represent the four groups that were brought
together to form the new Whale House. Together with the rain screen, the house
posts, tell stories of the clan. The artifacts and the Whale House itself were created
and dedicated in the traditional manner. The Ganexteidi hired another clan, the
Eagles, to construct the original house. The Eagles were then repaid in a traditional
‘payback party,’ and the property was brought out in a potlatch and dedicated as clan
property.33
The Whale House artifacts have long been identified as the finest examples of
Native American art in Alaska, and collectors and museums have sought to acquire
them. The University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology
offered to purchase the artifacts in 1922, but the tribe refused to sell. 34 In the
mid-1970s, the Arizona art dealer Michael Johnson twice attempted to acquire the
artifacts. Tribal concern over those attempts resulted in the Chilkat Indian Village
Council, the governing body of the Village under the Village’s IRA-authorized
constitution, enacting an ordinance prohibiting the removal of artifacts from
Klukwan in 1976. That ordinance provided:
No person shall enter on to the property of the Chilkat Indian Village
for the purpose of buying, trading for, soliciting the purchase of, or
otherwise seeking to arrange the removal of artifacts, clan crests, or
other traditional Indian art work owned or held by members of the
Chilkat Indian Village or kept within the boundaries of the real
property owned by the Chilkat Indian Village, without first
requesting and obtaining permission to do so from the Chilkat Indian
Village Council.

33 Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, No. 90-01, *17-18 (Chilkat Tr. Ct., Nov. 3, 1993),
available at http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/curriculum/tlingit/chilkatindianvillage/.
34 Id. at 18.
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No traditional Indian artifacts, clan crests, or other Indian art works
of any kind may be removed from the Chilkat Indian Village without
the prior notification of and approval by, the Chilkat Indian Village
Council. Chilkat Indian Village Council Ordinance of May 12, 1976.35
On April 22, 1984, several defendants removed the four posts and the
rain screen from Klukwan and delivered them to defendant Michael Johnson,
an Arizona art dealer. When the Village discovered that the artifacts had
been removed, it notified authorities of the State of Alaska. The State began
a criminal investigation, located the artifacts in a warehouse in Seattle,
Washington, and took custody of the artifacts. 36
The Village filed suit against Johnson and several tribe members who had
assisted him in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking to
enforce the ordinance. The District Court held that enforcement of tribal law against
tribe members did not give rise to federal jurisdiction, although enforcement against
Johnson, a non-tribe-member, did. It noted that:
The court agrees with the plaintiff in that the power to pass the
ordinance that is in dispute in this case was part of the retained,
inherent power of the Chilkat Indian Village. In addition, it would
appear that under its constitutional power, Chilkat Indian Village
had the power to prevent the sale or disposition of any assets of the
Village without the consent of the Council. The court further agrees
that alleged acquisition by a non-Indian of the artifacts in question
would constitute conduct that would have some direct effect on the
welfare of the tribe. Slip op. at 13-14 (Oct. 9, 1990).37
The District Court “submitted all issues pending in the case, including
challenges to tribal jurisdiction as well as the merits of the tribe’s claims that
Johnson and his corporation violated the tribal ordinance” to the Chilkat Indian
Village Tribal Court.38
As a preliminary matter, the Tribal Court noted that “[t]he law applicable in
this tribal court action is tribal law, which is comprised of both written and
unwritten, custom law of the village.” 39 After hearing testimony, the Tribal Court
found that the Whale House artifacts were
“clan trust property,” which great spiritual significance to the
Ganexteidi Clan, which has primary custodial rights over
them . . . [P]roperty is confirmed as being clan trust property . . . [by]
presenting it in a ceremony in which members of the opposite “tribe”
(i.e., in this case members of clans of the Eagle moiety) are invited,
35 Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Chilkat
Indian Village Council Ordinance (May 12, 1976)).
36 Id.
37Chilkat
Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, No. 90-01, at *3, available at
http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/curriculum/tlingit/chilkatindianvillage/.
38 Id.
39 Id. at *4.
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which completes the confirmation of the clan trust status of property
such as the Whale House artifacts, which . . . were subject to this
process . . . Under Tlingit law, such objects cannot be sold, unless for
some reason (such as restitution for a crime) the entire clan decides to
do so.40
Because the artifacts were clan trust property and could not be removed without
authorization from the Chilkat Indian Village Council, the court held that the
removal was illegal, and ordered that the artifacts be returned to Klukwan.
VI. HOPI KATSINAM AUCTIONS
In recent years several Parisian auctions of Native American sacred objects41
have highlighted the challenges for repatriation claims against private parties,
particularly in cross-border contexts. As with the Whale House artifacts, the
Katsinam auctions were by private parties, complicated by the cross-border aspect.
NAGPRA could not apply. The tribal claimants sought to halt the auctions, or at
least postpone them to allow time for a more complete investigation of the
circumstances of the Katsinams’ ownership. Their efforts were hampered by the
auction house’s refusal to disclose the name of the consignor and the presumption
under French law that the owner of a good is acting in good faith absent evidence to
the contrary. The tribal claimants brought international public opinion to bear, and
attempted to engage the United States and French governments to convince the
auction house to negotiate with the tribes.
LeRoy N. Shinoitewa, Chairman, Hopi Tribe, wrote to the auction house, setting
out the tribe’s concerns and requesting postponement of the auction:
These Katsinam, or friends, as the Hopi call them, represent the
spirit of deceased ancestors, animals, natural features and events,
and various deities. They are used by Hopis in connection with
prayers and ceremonies in which Hopi religious leaders perform their
trust obligation to protect the world . . . At this stage in the Hopi
investigation—which is nowhere near complete—potential buyers at
your auction must be informed that the Hopi Tribe suspects that the
items you are offering for sale are stolen religious patrimony and may
not be purchased or transferred without violating United States,
international and French norms. At a minimum potential purchasers
need to understand that, in purchasing these objects, they run the
risk of participating in illegality.42

Id. at *7-13.
Neret-Minet Tessier & Sarrou, Drouot Richelieu, Katsinam sale catalog (April 12, 2013),
available at http://keridouglas.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/neretminet-12042013-bd.pdf.
42 Letter from Chairman of Hopi Tribe, LeRoy N. Shingoitewa, to Gilles Neret-Minet, April 4,
2013.
40
41
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The auction house refused the tribe’s request, and the French Conseil des ventes
volontaires denied the tribe’s request for a temporary restraining order. The court
held that it was not shown (1) that the Hopi tribal council authorized the lawsuit, (2)
any French law prohibited the sale of sacred objects when held by private persons, (3)
any United States law prohibits the sale of Native American sacred objects when
held by private persons, or that (4) the objects were obtained by illegal means.
The auctions proceeded. At auction, the Annenberg Foundation was the
successful purchaser of certain objects and repatriated the objects to the tribes.
Subsequent Parisian auctions of Native American cultural items have also
proceeded, and still another is presently scheduled for early December 2015.
VII. CONCLUSION
While NAGPRA represents a significant advance in addressing repatriation
claims for Native American cultural items for which a federal nexus exists, it is at
best moral guidance in claims asserted against private parties. The statute’s lack of
extraterritorial reach renders it once again merely moral support in arguments for
repatriation of cultural items held outside of the United States. In both private and
cross-border situations, the key elements are (1) establishing tribal ownership or
non-alienability of the cultural items, (2) in the absence of tribal ownership/nonalienability, establishing the legal and moral wrongfulness of the removal (a
requirement often hampered by the unavailability of information and
documentation), and (3) strategic use of both public and political suasion.

